History 23/02/20 Prevented if the “General frost” the Germans to take Moscow in 1941
There is a popular belief that the unusually severe frosts in November of 1941 disrupted the final offensive of the Wehrmacht on Moscow. Many historians assert that the German troops were not provided with winter clothing because Hitler was planning a winter campaign. Find other reasons.
So, supposedly find precise evidence that Hitler blindly believed the predictions of some astrologers, naprorochili warm winter 1941/42 in Russia. In confirmation of all these words, love to repeat newsreels, which captured German soldiers near Moscow wanders in baskets made of ridiculous cunah and the mountain wrapped in some rags. The German generals (for example, H. Guderian) write that in late November frosts near Moscow reached minus 35 degrees, and in December slapped a 50-degree frosts. I don’t know if these reasons were explained to defeat the Germans alone. They are echoed and domestic writers on historical subjects.
First of all, let’s deal with the weather. At the end of October 1941, the first German offensive against Moscow can be considered Savassi in the mud. Because of impassable roads slowed the supply of artillery, ammunition and fuel reserves, as well as the approach to advanced infantry tank units of the Wehrmacht. For the first half of November, the Germans took operational pause.
Meteorological data, November-December 1941 in the Moscow region have been published subsequently, including in our time. Unusually cold weather in November 1941 in Central Russia was observed. The most severe frosts in November occurred during the operational pause, only to -15°, and that in a single night.
15 November, the Germans resumed the offensive. The entire second half of November, the temperature never dropped below -12°, keeping usually in the interval -5° … -10°. In this case the problem disappeared thaw. The dirt was frozen, and established a solids dirt roads, and a little frost would not hurt to start the motors. Snow cover was still low, and he did not interfere with the movement of infantry, tanks and vehicles, as well as transportation of supplies to troops of the Wehrmacht. Overcast weather allowed the Luftwaffe to routinely dominate the air. German General K. Tippelskirch testified: “at First mild frost and sparkling under the bright rays of the sun frost, raised the spirits of the soldiers, reaching, as they thought, in the last attack, and favored the promotion.”
severe frosts hit only in early December, when three consecutive nights the temperature fell to -25°. But the German offensive on the main lines to the North-West and South of Moscow was stopped 25-29 November, when a low temperature has not been observed. And in the first days of the Soviet counteroffensive, the temperature rose to zero degrees. Very severe frost (-33°and -37° at night) was established just before the New 1942. But by the time the advancing party has long been the Soviet troops.
so, the version that the German operation “Typhoon” broke from abnormal at this time of year frosts in Central Russia, is clearly not true. Absurd version of that Hitler forbade to supply the armed forces with winter clothing, to teach the soldiers to think that they must take Moscow before the onset of winter. First, the supplying of the troops with warm clothing was decided in the Wehrmacht, Hitler, and the relevant authorities below grade. Second, the plan “Barbarossa” provided for the continuation of hostilities after the capture of Moscow until the German withdrawal to the line of Arkhangelsk—Astrakhan. In addition, at the conclusion of hostilities, it was assumed that at least 70 divisions of the Wehrmacht will remain in Russia to hold the demarcation line and military occupation service. Next, in the Directive of 21 August 1941, in which Hitler pointed out that before the capture of Moscow it is necessary to achieve success in Leningrad and AtKrajina, to seize the Crimea and to break through to the Caucasus, he admitted the possibility of a winter campaign.
Painting with the provision of field forces of the Wehrmacht winter clothing reveals the dialogue Guderian to Hitler during a visit of General in Berlin in December 1941:
“— …Boots, clothes, gloves and balaclavas or absolutely not, or they are present in trace amounts.
Hitler was in a rage:
Is not true. Quartermaster-General informed me that winter clothing has been sent.
— of Course, the clothing sent, but it have yet not reached. I followed his path. The outfit is currently in Warsaw for a few weeks not going anywhere because of the lack of locomotives and the presence of traffic jams on the Railways”.
This is a key point. German troops in the decisive moment of the battle for Moscow was experiencing difficulties with the supply not only of winter clothing, but ammunition, fuel and all other necessary war materials to the front line. In addition to what is traditionally said about underestimating the Nazi leadership of the enemy forces, the increased resistance of the Soviet troops, etc., should pay attention to the complete failure of the German military planning in the field of logistics.
the German rolling stock was missing, as the Soviets were almost all destroyed or stolen on East pursuant to directives of Stalin on 3 July 1941. It was necessary to alter the gauge of Soviet Railways (also usually destroyed during the retreat) to the European standard, which did not have the strength of construction units. In addition, the closer to Moscow – the centre of communications in the entire European part of Russia – Soviet troops have been in a more advantageous position compared to German. To eliminate this advantage the red army, the Germans could only through broad coverage of Moscow, which they obviously did not have the strength.
In November 1941 the Germans tried to reach Moscow by a narrow ring, stepping Popperek main transport communications. It is even more difficult to supply German field troops, removed from their bases. In the rear of the Soviet troops close to the Moscow transport node allows you to quickly reinforce threatened areas. Thus, it is not “General Russian Winter” and not “stupid” Hitler allegedly did not give the German soldiers warm coats, responsible for the collapse of the offensive of the Wehrmacht on Moscow. The legend about these factors defeat was invented by the German generals in order to hide their own corporate blunder in the planning of the military campaign against Russia.
Yaroslav Butakov
Source:
© Russian Seven
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