A few days after Vladimir Putin was sworn in, the Kremlin began to adjust the medium to long-term domestic policy of the conflict against Ukraine and the West. Last week, Vladimir Putin decided against radical changes to the composition of the government and the presidential administration, but there is no shortage of surprises.

The latest personnel changes show the extent to which Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is now seen as the core task of the entire state. With regard to the future of the war, the signal is clear: the Kremlin will not give in, is relying on massive rearmament and is concentrating on converting the entire economy to the needs of a long war.

The Kremlin may have recognized an enormous need for control in the war economy, the supply of the armed forces, the fight against corruption in the defense department and the coordination of the armaments sector. Putin did not choose radicalized war ideologues, but rather experts who were largely ideologically neutral. At the same time, Russia’s president is implementing long-planned steps to rejuvenate his power system.

After the turbulent year of 2023, Vladimir Putin managed to largely bring the confusion and uncertainty among political elites and the population under control. Lacking an alternative, the elites acquiesced to Putin’s war plans without objection. The same applies to the Russian public, which appears neither able nor willing to resist. Through a gradual radicalization of public life, the entire political system is sworn into a quasi-“perpetual” war.

The Kremlin’s goal is clear: to ramp up the war economy. Five people in particular will bear primary responsibility for Russia’s conduct of the war.

Andrei Belousov (*1959) was a presidential adviser on economic issues for many years and since 2020, as First Deputy Prime Minister, has been responsible for economic development, foreign trade, counter-sanctions policy, transport and the national drone development project, among other things. The trained economist will now closely integrate the Ministry of Defense, the government and the economic sector with the military-industrial complex. He was already responsible for arms-related imports via the grey market and was thus entrusted with circumventing international sanctions. In addition to building up the war economy, he will have to eradicate the worst frictional losses caused by corruption.

Anton Alikhanov (*1986) belongs to the new elite generation of so-called young technocrats and was governor of the strategically important exclave of Kaliningrad from 2017 to 2024. As the new Minister of Industry and Trade, Alikhanov will be responsible, together with Beloussov, for the transition to a war economy.

Alexei Dyumin (*1972) was Vladimir Putin’s bodyguard. As deputy head of the GRU military intelligence service and commander of the armed forces’ special operations forces, Dyumin was involved in the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Governor of the Tula Region (2016-2024), he was one of the most popular Russian regional politicians. In his role as presidential advisor in the presidential administration, Dyumin will primarily oversee the expansion and equipment of the Russian armed forces as well as the transition to a war economy.

Valeri Gerasimov (*1955) remains responsible for military issues as Chief of the General Staff. The fact that Gerasimov was not removed is interesting because every time there has been a change in defense minister, the chief of general staff has also been replaced.

Sergei Shoigu (*1955) was an influential Minister of Emergency Management (1994-2012), briefly governor of the Moscow Region. With over a decade at the helm of the Defense Ministry (2012-2024), he was at the epicenter of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine that began in 2014. Because of his loyalty to Putin, Shoigu will not be removed from power, but will be promoted and, as Secretary of the Security Council, his main task will be to coordinate Russia’s so-called “special military operation” against Ukraine.

Russia’s long-time Defense Minister (2012-2024) Sergei Shoigu was, contrary to expectations, not demoted. After all, Shoigu did not show his best side at the head of the Defense Ministry. Especially after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Shoigu seemed overwhelmed and simply incompetent for long periods.

The kleptocratic system he did not establish in the Ministry of Defense, but perfected, led to acute shortages and a whole series of disastrous defeats for the Russian armed forces. And his personal feud with the financier of the Russian mercenary group Wagner, Yevgeny Prigozhin, almost culminated in a full-blown state crisis.

Shoigu’s personal loyalty to Putin may have saved him, as Dmitri Medvedev once did, and may have been the real reason for his appointment as Secretary of the Security Council. Meanwhile, the demotion of the influential Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev came as perhaps the biggest surprise.

Since 2022, Nikolai Patrushev has been considered by many observers to be the Kremlin’s gray eminence on ideological issues. There has been intense speculation about Patrushev’s new assignment, including the creation of a new structure to coordinate intelligence activities.

On May 14, the Kremlin announced that Patrushev would assume the role of presidential adviser on shipbuilding affairs. Quite a few observers saw this as a humiliating degradation. In fact, his biography has a connection to shipbuilding issues.

Patrushev graduated from the Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute in 1974 and worked in a design office for a few months before joining the KGB in 1975. In any case, the decision forms an amusing historical parallel to the fate of Stalin’s People’s Commissar for the Interior and General Commissar for State Security, Nikolai Yezhov, who was primarily responsible for implementing the Great Terror purges. Before his final dismantling and execution, Yezhov was stripped of all his positions and demoted to People’s Commissar of Inland Navigation.

It is quite possible that Putin has grown tired of the rumors about Patrushev’s role as the Kremlin’s grey eminence and the alleged successor role of Patrushev’s son Dmitri and wanted to send a clear signal of power. It is also quite possible that Patrushev, at 73, asked the head of state for a quieter position for health reasons. That would not be unusual.

Of course, the officially assigned task says nothing conclusive about Nikolai Patrushev’s future influence. Given Russia’s personalistic power system, it is less the official position that determines the actual degree of influence, but rather the personal proximity to Vladimir Putin. Finally, Patrushevs remains a permanent member of the Security Council.

With his latest personnel decisions, Putin is also taking important steps to rejuvenate his power system and prepare the transition to a post-Putin Russia. These questions are not limited to the person of a single successor.

For years, an entire successor generation has been taking a power-political position and is gaining strength, profile and influence. The young technocrats can be found in many influential positions, for example Anton Vajno (*1972), chairman of the presidential administration, Aysen Nikolayev (*1972), head of the Republic of Yakutia, Maxim Oreshkin (*1982), new deputy head of the presidential administration, or also the new Minister of Industry and Trade Anton Alikhanov (*1986).

Role model: Deng Xiaoping or Lee Kuan Yew

For himself, Putin probably intended the thinking and guiding role in the generational change and the evolutionary restructuring of the entire state and power system – probably following the example of Deng Xiaoping or Lee Kuan Yew.

The so-called young technocrats have often studied at renowned universities in western countries, have a decidedly Anglo-Saxon demeanor and yet are not pro-Western. They approach complex problems in a more solution-oriented manner, are not afraid to enter into conflicts and appear surprisingly apolitical. 

They do not resemble the old (post-)Soviet bureaucracy – sycophantic towards superiors and politicians, imperious towards subordinates and the population – but are cool pragmatists of power and loyal to Vladimir Putin as their political foster father.

The political subjugation of Ukraine remains Moscow’s immediate war goal. But the main target is the West. The Kremlin wants to inflict a humiliating strategic defeat on this. Ultimately, Western societies should learn to fear Russia again.

Vladimir Putin is preparing Russia for a long war with his recent personnel decisions. Through a gradual radicalization of public life, both the political elites and the population are brought into line and committed to a “forever” war. In the future, the main responsibility for Russian warfare and the war economy will lie with five people: Defense Minister Andrei Beloussov, Industry and Trade Minister Anton Alikhanov, Presidential Advisor Alexei Dyumin, Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov. The Kremlin’s former gray eminence, Nikolai Patrushev, was removed from power. The main goal of the Russian war of aggression remains the political subjugation of Ukraine and thus a strategic defeat of the West.

By Alexander Dubowy

The original for this article “Putin is converting Russia’s power apparatus for eternal war – with radical methods” comes from Der Pragmaticus.